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THE NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE:
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL ASSOCIATIONS
AND PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
1. THE PROBLEM: ACCESS To INFORMATION,
NEWSMEN'S ETHICS,
AND THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES
A newsman deals in information. He must assent to certain
conditions imposed by his suppliers in order to obtain that in-
formation which becomes the "news." One condition frequently
imposed is that the newsman maintain the anonymity of his con-
fidant.1 Another is that the information provided be used only by
the newsman and not be published itself.2 As a matter of profes-
sional ethics the newsman is required to respect his confidant's
wishes and protect the information and the identity of its source.
Generally this is not a significant problem.
Today, however, the newsman is more and more frequently
being called upon to testify in either a legislative or judicial
proceeding, and is compelled to disclose confidential information
and sources under threat of citation for contempt. The newsman
then faces a dilemma: betray his confidences and breach his ethics
by disclosure, or defy the court or legislative body and be pun-
ished.3 The result is that the newsman, in providing a needed and
valuable public service, must personally pay a high price-fine or
imprisonment by the court, or evaporation of his news sources by
betrayal. The problem is that
most news is communicated to reporters out of friendship
for the reporter or because of a vague feeling that the publica-
tion of news is a good thing. The reporter knows that, since
he performs no service for the source, he must at least do all
he can to avoid causing him injury. It is a matter of profes-
sional survival. 4
A survey conducted by authors Guest & Stanzler shows that a substantial number of
stories, excluding short gossip items, based on confidential information are published by
daily newspapers throughout the United States. Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional
Argument J'r Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REv. 18, 57-61 (1969).
2 Appendix I illustrates the practice of politicians and government officials of supplying
information for the newsman's use only, and not for publication or attribution.
3 For a shocking example of the newsman's dilemma, and the potential consequences of
the absence of a newsman's privilege, see Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1, at 45-46,
relating an experience of Eugene Patterson, editor of the Atlanta Constitution.
4 Note, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's Source: A Compromise Proposal, 54
Nw. L. REV. 243, 247-48 (1959).
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The purpose of this comment is to determine whether the
confidential associations and-or private communications of a
newsman are privileged.
II. THE PUBLIC'S NEED FOR A NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE
The newsman's claim that forced disclosure of confidential
relationships would dry up his news sources has never been
challenged. 5 Analysis of the effects of such forced disclosures
indicates that society pays a heavy price when testimonial com-
pulsion is attempted.6 For example, the appearance of the New
York Times Denver correspondent before the House Internal
Security Committee last year has had a "severely detrimental
effect" on his ability, and the ability of other reporters, to cover
S.D.S. and other radical student groups. 7 Furthermore, the recent
compulsory grand jury appearance of New York Times reporter
Earl Caldwell has already had an inhibiting effect on the ability of
the other reporters to cover the Black Panthers." CBS newsman
Walter Cronkite, has said that "[w]ithout such materials, I would
be able to do little more than broadcast press releases and public
statements." 9 In citing some of his common sources and the
information which they provide, Cronkite listed a Senate staff
member (concerning the senator's decision not to seek
re-election), a Pentagon officer (Administration pressures on mili-
tary cut-back in Viet-Nam), and a noted scientist (criticism of the
AEC).10 Mr. Cronkite's reliance on public officials for much of
what he considers vital information is significant because govern-
ment officials, perhaps more so than any other class of con-
fidential news source, are adamant that their request for anonym-
ity be respected." The frequency with which newsmen publish
materials obtained in "off-the-record" or "background" briefings
or statements is evidenced by the recurring attribution of news to
"high administration sources" or "extremely reliable sources."
The embarrassment and chilling effect that forced disclosure
would have on confidential sources such as high level civil ser-
vants, military officers, and cabinet-level officials is obvious. Cur-
5 The claim was not challenged by the Garland court, Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took
judicial notice of this fact. See In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 41, 193 A.2d 18 1, 185 (1963).
6 Supra note 1.
7 See Brief of the New York Times Company, as amicus curiae, In Support of Appel-
lant, In re Grand Jury Witness Earl Caldwell, U.S.C.A., 9th Cir., No. 26025, at 6-7.8 Id.
9 N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1970, at 28, col. 1.
10 Id.
1' See Adelson, Subpoena Siege-Have the News Media Become too Big to Fight?, 53
SAT. REV., Mar. 14, 1970, at 107.
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tailment of the newsman's relationship with these sources could
reduce vital information about government activity to a mere
trickle. 12 Moreover, since the immediate concern for the Framers
in drafting the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the
press was the establishment of a press that would be free to
investigate and expose all instances of government corruption or
misconduct, l3 the need for a newsman's privilege in this context is
particularly compelling.
However, the need for the privilege is not confined solely to the
dealings of newsmen with confidential government news sources.
The past decade was a period of rapid social change-a time
during which many people first began seriously to question and
challenge "accepted" values and roles. The Kerner Commission
observed in 1968 that, "Our Nation is moving toward two so-
cieties, one black, one white-separate and unequal."'1 4 Of par-
ticular importance here is the Commission's concern over the
failure of the news media to report adequately on race relations
and ghetto problems. As the Report states, the news media
".... have not communicated to the majority of their au-
dience-which is white-a sense of the degradation, misery, and
hopelessness of life in the ghetto."' 15 The Report reveals that
ghetto blacks distrust and dislike the media, which they frequently
refer to as the "white press."' 6 Recognizing the obvious danger
inherent in shutting off alienated groups from a communication
forum through which they can effectively express their griev-
ances, the Commission recommended that the news media expand
their coverage of the black community, integrate black activities
into all aspects of coverage and content, and establish more and
better links with the black community.' 7 These goals can never be
attained in an atmosphere of distrust of the newsman's promises
of confidentiality.
127The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, was strongly supported by the
press as a means of reducing the need to rely on confidential sources in gaining access to
pertinent news concerning government activity. However, Professor Davis, in an exhaus-
tive analysis of the act, has concluded that the press will benefit little from it. See Davis,
The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967).
13 See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960), quoting Madison:
"The liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this government."
I Annals of Congress 738 (1789).
14 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
15 Id. at 10.
16 Id. at 206.
17 Id. at 10. In a survey by the Commission of the attitudes of 5,000 blacks and whites
in 15 major American cities, one question asked for ways in which a disturbance like the
one in Detroit in 1967 could be avoided. The reply showing the highest correlation
between the answers of blacks and whites cited the need for improving communications
between the two groups. SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS, Table V-d at 48 (1968).
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The belief that disobedience to law is justified when a good
cause cannot be furthered without violence is a view widely held
by many students, blacks and other groups pressing for social
change in America today. 18 Increasingly, protesters speak of rev-
olution as a necessary instrument for effecting needed improve-
ments, charging that the established channels for change are in-
adequate to the task. 19 Any act which limits or stills these de-
mands may lead to increased alienation of these groups. Limita-
tions on freedom of speech and press must be justified by a
compelling need, since the test of society's commitment to free
expression is not whether it can tolerate minor deviations, but
whether it will allow uninhibited criticism of its fundamental be-
liefs and practices. But when such criticisms are voiced, the drive
to repress or silence them may become overwhelming. 20 In the
words of Dean Goldstein, "[t]he paranoid tendencies latent in a
mass society are running unusually strong these days and make all
the more essential a clear standard which strikes the proper bal-
ance between the demands of confidentiality and those of the
public interest." 21
In view of the great interest currently focused on "political"
prosecutions involving such groups as the Black Panthers and
Weathermen, no court today can casually conclude that forced
disclosure of a newsman's confidential sources will have a negli-
gible effect on the free flow of news. Moreover, in view of the
increasing tendency of the government to rely on the news media
to gather evidence, 22 news sources might reasonably conclude
that the media are merely an investigative arm of government, a
conclusion which would further corrode the vital newsman-source
relationship.
Any disruption of the tenuous channels of communication be-
tween alientated segments and the mainstream of our society is a
loss which the public cannot afford. Testimonial compulsion in
this context destroys the vital-and weakest-line in the chain of
public communication, the relationship between the newsman and
his confidential source. The public's need to maintain a free flow
18 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION
OF VIOLENCE (Eisenhower Commission) 92 (1969).
19 Id. at 95.
20 EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (1966).
21 Goldstein, New'smen and Their Confidential Sources, 162 NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 21,
1970, at 13-14.
22 Letter from James C. Goodale, General Counsel, the New York Times, to author,
August 6, 1970. In the recent case of Illinois v. Dohrn, No. 60-3808 (Cir. Ct. of Cook
Cty.-Crim. Div., May 20, 1970), the court considered this possibility also in granting a
motion to quash subpoenas issued to several newspapers. The decision is reprinted in
N.Y. Times Brief, supra note 3, Appendix D, at 8.
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of news concerning both these disaffected groups and all sectors
of government activity, arguably outweighs the claims of judicial
administrative efficiency put forth to justify testimonial com-
pulsion in the case of newsmen.
III. THE NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE UNDER STATE LAW
An understanding of the principles underlying the traditional
privileges and their application to the newsman's privilege is im-
portant. Wigmore defined these principles as fundamental condi-
tions required for the granting of a privilege:
(I) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the par-
ties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the dis-
closure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 23
Although a privilege for a newsman's confidential associations
and private communications would no doubt meet Wigmore's
criteria, no court thus far has applied the standard to the news-
man-source relationship.
A. The Newsman's Privilege At Common Law
There simply is no common law privilege which protects the
confidential associations and private communications of newsmen
from compulsory disclosure in legislative and judicial proceed-
ings.2 4 "Neither in England nor in the United States does the
common law give a newsman the privilege to conceal confidential
sources,"2 5 and courts having an opportunity to rule on the ques-
tion have uniformly denied the existence of a common law news-
man's privilege.26 Despite the absence of a common law news-
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
24 Id. at § 2286.
25 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1. at 20.
26 1.U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d. Cir.).
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
2. U.S. District Court, Hawaii. In the Matter of Wayne, 4 U.S.D.C. Hawaii 475
(1914).
3. U.S. District Court, New York. Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F.Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
4. U.S. District Court, Massachusetts. Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp..
20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957).
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man's privilege, attempts have been made to create such protec-
tion. Newsmen have claimed a privilege on the basis of the
public's interest in the free flow of news and by analogizing the
reporter-source relationship to traditional relationships such as
attorney-client. 27 However, the courts have clearly been loathe to
create a common law privilege for newsmen, and have universally
rejected such claims. In Garland v. Torre, 28 Judge Stewart (now
Mr. Justice Stewart), refusing to extend the privilege to a news
columnist called as a witness by Judy Garland in a libel action,
stated:
The privilege not to disclose relevant evidence obviously,
constitutes an extraordinary exception to the general duty to
testify ... the tendency should be 'not to extend the classes
to whom the privilege from disclosure is granted, but to
restrict that privilege . . . ' to recognize the privilege asserted
here, assuming our power to do so, would poorly serve the
cause of justice. 29
A similarly unfavorable judicial attitude towards the newsman's
privilege is found In re Goodfader's Appeal, a case involving the
failure of a newsman to disclose his source of information con-
cerning an attempt to fire a civil service employee. The court,
noting the lack of both a state privilege statute and common law
support for such protection for newsmen, refused to grant the
reporter a privilege. Rejecting the newsman's arguments that the
rationale underlying established privileges, i.e., source relation-
ship, justified protection of the newsman, the court, quoting from
5. California Supreme Court. People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897);
Exparte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 p. 124 (1897).
6. Colorado Supreme Court. Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919);
Murphy v. Colorado, unreported, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
7. Florida Supreme Court. Clein v. State, 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950).
8. Georgia Supreme Court. Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911).
9. Hawaii Supreme Court. In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472
(1961).
10. New Jersey Supreme Court. In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913).
11. New York. People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1874);
People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E.
415 (Ct. App. 1936).
12. Oregon Supreme Court. State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (en
banc), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
13. Application of Caldwell, 311 F.Supp. 358 (N.D.Cal. 1970). This decision held
that confidential associations of a newsman are privileged on federal con-
stitutional grounds, rather than common law grounds. See also Air Transport
Assn. v. PATCO, No. 70-C-400, T. at 18-23 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 1970).
27 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1, at 18.
28 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
29-259 F.2d at 550, quoting People v. County Sheriff of N.Y., 269 N.Y. at 295, 199
N.E. at 416.
3045 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
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the New York case of People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New
York County,31 said:
The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all
information by witnesses in order that justice may prevail.
The granting of a privilege from such disclosure ... as it now
exists often, in particular cases, works a hardship. 32
The court found the tendency was to restrict granting of privileges
rather than to enlarge the classes of protected relationships and
stated that if a news press privilege should be created, "it should
be done by the Legislature which has thus far refused to enact
such legislation." 33 Thus, the courts have been concerned more
with the needs of the judicial process in requiring witnesses to
testify and general notions of fairness and justice than with pos-
sible analogies between the newsman's privilege and other privi-
leges.
Nevertheless it is useful to consider how the newsman's privi-
lege compares with other specific privileges. The husband-wife
and juror privileges are clearly not analogous because the very
relationships from which those privileges arise are created, and
recognized, by the law. In contrast, the newsman-source relation-
ship is not established by law.
While there is a close analogy between the newsman's privilege
and the attorney-client, doctor-patient, and penitent-priest privi-
leges, the analogy is imperfect. First, each of these traditional
privileges results from a direct personal right belonging to the
confiding party, i.e., certain inalienable human rights, which are
constitutionally recognized. 34 The person who confides in a news-
man, however, has no such right, and, indeed, may often be
violating a confidence he owes to someone else.
Second, the client who confides in his attorney, the patient who
confides in his doctor and the penitent who confides in his priest
all receive direct personal benefit from the relationship. However,
the confidential source who provides information to newsmen
receives only a vague, indirect satisfaction from his commu-
nication.
This aspect of the traditionally privileged relationships has been
relied on by courts, often implicity, in granting the privilege.
Upholding the attorney-client privilege, the court in Comercio E
31 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (Ct. App. 1936).
32 367 P.2d at 482-483.
33 367 P.2d at 483, quoting People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York Co., 199
N.E. at 416.
34 Guest & Stanzler, supra note I, at 26.
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Industria Continental, S.A. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., said that
although confidential information might be relevant evidence, its
"revelation will impair the social good derived from the proper
performance of the functions of lawyers for their clients." 35 A
similar justification was expressed by the court in Hammonds v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,36 with respect to the doctor-patient privi-
lege. In this case, a patient sued his doctor's malpractice insurer
for inducing the doctor to disclose confiidential information gained
through the doctor-patient relationship. Here the court reasoned
that confidentiality of communication was necessary to insure the
complete frankness on the patient's part necessary for diagnosis.
Speaking for the court, Judge Connell explained:
To encourage the desired candor, men of law have formu-
lated a strong policy of confidentiality to assure patients that
only they themselves may unlock the doctor's silence in re-
gard to those private disclosures. 37
Third, although the attorney-client, doctor-patient, and peni-
tent-priest privileges protect only the private communications of
the parties, and not the confidential relationship itself,38 advocates
of the newsman privilege require protection for both the con-
fidential information, and the fact of the newsman-source associ-
ation. Only confidences made to an attorney, doctor, or priest are
protected from disclosure whereas the newsman must protect the
identity of his confidant, as well as the private communications
made to him, in order to assure the freeflow of news.
Fourth, the doctor-patient and priest-penitent privileges are
statutory privileges not recognized at common law.39 Only the
attorney-client privilege originated in the common law, although
today it is frequently codified. 40
On the other hand, the courts have also recognized that public
policy may well be as important a factor as common law tradition
in deciding whether to grant a privilege against compulsory dis-
closure of confidential associations and private communications.
In Hammonds, the court found that the public interest was the
underlying justification for the doctor-patient privilege, rather than
common law formulations for precedents. The court defined pub-
35 19 F.R.D. 513, 514. (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
36 243 F.Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (penitent-priest privilege).
37 243 F.Supp. at 797.
38 Attorney-Client Privilege: United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1964);
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2306-2309 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
39 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2380, 2394 (McNaughtord rev. 1961).
40 Id. at §§ 2290, 2292.
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lic policy in terms of "the community common sense and commor
conscience, extended and applied throughout the state to matters
of public morals, public health, public safety, public welfare and
the like." 41 The court found that although public policy consid-
erations would occasionally be established constitutionally, statu-
torily or by case precedent, the most general method of discerning
the public interest is through "the customs and conventions of the
people-in their clear consciousness and conviction of what is
naturally and inherently just and right between man and man." 42
A similar attitude was expressed by Chief Judge Fahy in Mullen
v. United States:43
When reason and experience call for recognition of a privilege
which has the effect of restricting evidence the dead hand of
the common law will not restrain such recognition. 44
However, most closely analogous to the newsman privilege is
the informer privilege which protects both the source and in-
formation disclosed to a law enforcement official. 45 First, neither
the disclosure made by an informer nor that of a news source
directly involve a personal right of the one making the disclosure.
Rather, with respect to an informer, the privilege has been said to
be the Government's privilege to withhold the identity of persons
providing information concerning a violation of the law. 46
Second, the informer generally receives no direct personal
benefit from his disclosure, although informers are occasionally
paid, and in any event, has no inherent right to such benefits.
Instead, the benefit is to the public at large, and it is for this
reason that the privilege is granted. As Mr. Justice Burton stated
in upholding the informer's privilege: "The purpose of the privi-
lege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in
effective law enforcement. ' 47 The Second Circuit more fully ex-
plained this purpose in United States v. Tucker,48 where defen-
dant, convicted of narcotics possession, sought to appeal on
4' 243 F. Supp. at 796.
42 243 F. Supp. at 796-797.
- 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
44 263 F. 2d at 279.
45 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1, at 36.
46 Roviaro v. J.S., 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
47 353 U.S. at 59. However, in this case it was found that disclosure of their identities
was necessary. The informer's privilege was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Rugen-
dorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964). The public interest rationale for upholding the
informer's privilege was similarly used in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Burlington, 351
F.2d 762, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1965), where the court stated that the purpose of the privilege
was to guarantee government receipt of information, not to protect the informer. "The
privilege is maintained to encourage possible informers in the future by giving them some
assurance of anonymity."
"380 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1967).
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grounds that there was no probable cause for his arrest. In order
to establish this defense, the defendant sought the identity of a
government informer. In upholding the anonymity of the informer,
the court balanced the defendant's need for disclosure against
the strong public interest in encouraging the freeflow of in-
formation to law enforcement officers. An informant may
volunteer'information to government agents for a variety of
reasons .... but it has been the experience of law enforce-
ment officers that the prospective informer will usually condi-
tion his cooperation on an assurance of anonymity, fearing
that if disclosure is made, physical harm or other undesirable
consequences may be visited upon him or his family. 49
The third similarity between the informer's privilege and the
proposed newsman privilege is that the informer privilege applies
both to the confidential relationship and to the private commu-
nications which result therefrom. 50 Fourth, since the informer's
privilege apparently was recognized at common law,51 it provides
a more appropriate analogy for a judicially created privilege than
do those statutory privileges existing solely as a matter of legisla-
tive grace.
The only possible limitation on the validity of the informer's
privilege analogy is that the Supreme Court recognized the in-
former privilege as a qualified privilege which must give way,
"where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the con-
tents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense
of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a
cause .... -52 Thus, the informer's privilege must be determined
by weighing society's interest in free flow of information against
the defendant's need for disclosures. 53 This balancing approach,
however, may merely be a transitional court rule, for as the court
said in the Westinghouse case: "To the extent that the Roviaro
balancing test becomes known to potential informers, it will ad-
versely affect the policy for which the privilege exists." 54 Indeed,
restrictions may have already been placed on the type of balanc-
ing that will be done. "Mere speculation" 55 that disclosure of the
informer might help the defendant's case is not enough to out-
weigh society's interest in preserving the informant's anonymity.
Arguably, a qualified newsman's privilege might be sufficient,
380 F.2d at 213.
50353 U.S. at 61.
518 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961); U.S. v. Tucker, 380 F.2d
at 211.
52353 U.S. at 60-61.
53 353 U.S. at 62.
54 351 F.2d at 769.
55 351 F.2d at 769.
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although authorities disagree. 56 Nevertheless, a qualified privilege
would be an acceptable starting point, and might be easier for a
court to accept.
In the final analysis it is doubtful whether any court will accept
an analogy to another privilege as the sole basis for creating a
newsman's privilege. A court's willingness to uphold the news-
man's privilege will not turn upon a close analogy, but will require
the marshalling of a more commanding legal theory.
B. The Statutory Newsman's Privilege
Fourteen states have enacted statutes which provide a news-
man's privilege.57 The table on pages 96-97 indicates the nature
of each newsman's privilege statute.58
Generally the statutory newsman's privilege is not as extensive
as seems desirable. While most of the statutes grant an absolute
privilege, the privilege protects only the source, and not private
communications and documents. Only the Pennsylvania statute
extends the privilege to the relationship, communications, and
documents. 59 However, the recently enacted New York statute
protects both confidential associations and private commu-
nications, although it does not mention documents.
To date, only one case has tested the constitutionality of the
newsman's privilege statutes. In a very brief opinion in Ex parte
Sparrow,60 the court held only that the claim that the Alabama
newsman's privilege statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution was without merit.
In conclusion, the newsman's privilege statutes provide only
limited protection. Although a few statutes provide only a quali-
fied privilege, most statutes provide an absolute privilege for the
newsman's confidential associations, and some statutes extend
their protection to private communications and documents. Only
the recent New York statute affords complete protection on its
face.
56 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1, at 50-55; Note, Compulsory Disclosure of a News-
man's Source:A Compromise Proposal, 54 Nw. L. REV. 243 (1959).
57 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1969);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.00 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 45: 1451-54
(Cum. Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1)
(1954); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 93, ch. 601-2 (1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:
84A-21,-29 (Supp. 1969); Ch. 615, § I [1970] N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1357; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2739. 12 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (1958).
58 The analysis is based upon a literal interpretation of the statutes on their faces, except
where a judicial interpretation is cited.
59 The protection of communications and documents was created by judicial fiat. In re
Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
60 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
FALL 19701
96 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 4:1
Q zz zzz7 7
cjn
HU Cl
H ) 0
S0 00 000
U C.Q ZZ ZZ Z zz z<
z
< LU
<
u-
'
04
M C) 0I 00 = =
-C N
C "7t0o
<7 U -
FALL 1970] The Newsman's Privilege
L. 00 °
0 0 0 C-
Z Z: c- Z ; F- ?S a
°°
)00 00
00~
<00
I
ON 0
1Z
0
C
Journal of Law Reform
IV. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUE
A. What Is Freedom Of The Press?
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that there shall be no abridgment of the freedom of the
press. 61 To date, however, the Supreme Court, which defines the
nature and scope of the First Amendment's protection,6 2 has
chosen not to review any decision regarding the newsman's privi-
lege. 63 While the denial of certiorari is not to be regarded as an
indication of the Court's opinion on the issue involved,6 4 it is
noteworthy that in all of the cases denied certiorari the lower
courts had held that the First Amendment freedom of the press
did not include the newsman's privilege. Thus, the current status
of the newsman's privilege is uncertain:
Though commonly regarded as somewhat generally protected
by freedom of the press, with particular restraints thereon as
reasonable to protect weightier public interests, the existence
and extent of judicial recognition of a constitutionally-
protected right of the press to gather news remains un-
settled. 65
The decisions of state supreme courts and inferior federal
courts have, with one recent exception, held that the First
Amendment freedom of the press does not include news gathering
in general or the right of newsmen to protect their confidential
associations and private communications in particular. 66 The only
authority upholding news gathering and the newsman's privilege
as a constitutional right protected by the First Amendment is the
recent case of Application of Caldwell.67 However, in order to
evaluate both sides of the question, it is necessary to examine the
rationale of each case. Often courts have committed the fallacy of
assuming "as an axiom the interest in compulsory testimony with-
61 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
62 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
63 The Court has been presented several opportunities to determine the issue. In re
Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1956); Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Murphy v. Colorado, unre-
ported, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729,
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
64 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 495 (1970).
65 Recent Decisions, Right of News Media Personnel to Refuse to Disclose
Confidential Sources of Information, 61 MICH. L. REV. 184, 188-89 (1962).
66 In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126, A.2d 679, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 1002 (1956); Garland
v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Goodfader's
Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181
(1963); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
67 311 F.Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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out analyzing whether forced disclosure in particular cases would
serve the underlying policy of effective judicial administration. "68
It has been argued that the First Amendment does not give
newsmen any greater right to gather news than that possessed by
the general public. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court used this
reasoning in the case of In re Mack,69 in which the court
affirmed the criminal contempt convictions of photographers who
had taken photographs of a convicted murderer in violation of a
county court rule. The court did not give an extended discussion
of the constitutional principles involved, but relied instead upon
its right to maintain order and preserve its dignity and the con-
victed murderer's right of privacy.70 As a result, the case is of
questionable value in determining the vital constitutional law issue
of the scope of the freedom of the press. Courts have also main-
tained that the phrase "freedom of the press" could not be ex-
panded to encompass a newsman's refusal to divulge his sources.
In the case of In re Taylor,71 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that a newsman has no constitutional right to refuse to
disclose sources of information under either the Pennsylvania or
the United States Constitution. In Taylor, the president and city
editor of a newspaper had been found in contempt for refusing to
answer questions about the source of their information before a
grand jury investigating criminal conduct and corruption in gov-
ernment. Despite their denial of constitutional practice for news-
men, the court did recognize that disclosure could destroy the
newsman-source relationship upon which the public depends for
its information:
[lI]nformation, tips and leads will dry up and the public will
often be deprived of the knowledge of dereliction of public
duty, bribery, corruption, conspiracy and other crimes com-
mitted or possibly committed by public officials or by pow-
erful individuals or organizations, unless newsmen are able to
fully and completely protect the sources of the information. It
is vitally important that this public shield against govern-
mental inefficiency, corruption and crime be preserved
against piercing and erosion. 72
Another court's conclusion that the First Amendment does not
68Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1, at 19.
69 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1956).
70 126 A.2d at 682-683.
71 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
72 193 A.2d at 184. Since the court held that newsmen were fully protected by the
Pennsylvania newsmen's privilege statute, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision on
the First Amendment question was unnecessary and unfortunate. Therefore, it should be
accorded little weight as a precedent for similar situations.
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give a newsman a constitutional right to protect his sources is also
based on the ground that a newsman cannot have a right to gather
information superior to that of the general public, because to
allow such special privilege would violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 For example, in State v.
Buchanan,74 the editor of a college newspaper was convicted of
contempt of court for refusing to disclose the identity of her
sources of information regarding the use of marijuana on campus.
There was no common law or statutory newsman's privilege un-
der state law. The Oregon Supreme Court, sitting en banc, held
that the First Amendment freedom of the press does not give a
newsman a constitutional right to protect the anonymity of his
confidential informants in the face of a court order requiring
disclosure, since such a right would amount to a special privilege
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. This proposition was
stated ipse dixit, the court's only authority being a case note in the
Oregon Law Review. The court further held that newsmen have
no constitutional right to information which is not available to the
public generally. 75 Since the court's authority was merely a group
of cases involving the use of stolen documents by journalists cited
in a footnote without a discussion of their applicability to the
significantly different situation at hand, 76 Buchanan provides an
insufficient foundation for a full dress argument of the scope of the
First Amendment.
Denial of constitutional protection to the newsman-source rela-
tionship is also approached through the balance test in which
courts weigh freedom of the press against the needs of effective
administration of justice. Thus in Garland v. Torre,7 7 Judge Stew-
art (now Mr. Justice Stewart) held that compelling the news-
woman to disclose her confidential associations did not violate the
First Amendment. The Judge recognized that forced disclosure of
the newswoman's confidential sources of information might in-
fringe freedom of the press by curtailing the free flow of news, but
observed that freedom of the press, though crucial to a free
society, was not an absolute right. 78 The test applicable in weigh-
ing these conflicting interest was
73 State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) (en
banc).
74 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 732.
75 436 P.2d at 736.
76436 P.2d at 736.
77 259 F.2d 545. In this case, a newswoman had been convicted of criminal contempt
for refusing to identify a CBS executive who had made defamatory statements about Judy
Garland.
78 259 F.2d at 548.
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whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony
of the witness in the present case justifies some impairment of
this First Amendment freedom. 79
The court noted that both a free press and courts empowered
to discover the truth were fundamental to a free society, and the
duty of a witness to testify occasionally required an invasion of
the witness' First Amendment rights to privacy and to remain
silent. The Judge concluded that "[t]he personal sacrifice involved
is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the
welfare of the public."180 Thus, even if freedom of the press were
involved, "it too must give place under the Constitution to a
paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice." 81
The court valued the administration of justice more highly than
the First Amendment rights involved since the judiciary's capa-
city to function is crucial to society's existence: judicial adminis-
tration serves "an indispensable function of civilized society, that
of adjudicating controversies between its citizens and between
citizens and the state through legal tribunals in accordance with
their historic procedures.- 82 In concluding that the First Amend-
ment did not protect the appellent's refusal to testify, Judge Stew-
art noted that the appellant's situation was distinguishable from a
case involving "a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's con-
fidential sources [or]... a case where the identity of the news
source is of doubtful relevance or materiality. a"8 3 This analysis,
however, fails to consider whether compulsory disclosure is al-
ways.crucial to effective judicial administration, or whether other
alternatives to forced testimoney of newsmen might be available.
Thus the Garland opinion also seems unsatisfactory since it gives
but cursory consideration to the important constitutional issue
involved.
A corollary of the balance test argument is that since no First
Amendment right is absolute, lack of freedom must be balanced
against competing rights which might be denied should the First
Amendment freedom be upheld. "The private or individual in-
terest involved must, in each case, be weighed in balance against
the public interest affected. " 84 Such weighing of conflicting in-
79 259 F.2d at 548.
80 259 F.2d at 549, quoting Blair v. U.S., 250 U.S. at 28 I.
81 259 F.2d at 549.
82 259 F.2d at 549, quoting Justice Frankfurter in Bridges v. California. 314 U.S. 252, at
291 (1941) (dissenting opinion). See Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205
U.S. 454, 462-463 (1907).
83 259 F.2d at 549-50. Cf. National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State
of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464-465 (1958).
84 In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472, 478 (1961).
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terests was the basis for the decision in In re Goodfader's Ap-
peal,85 where a civil servant ousted from her job as personnel
director of the Civil Service Commission of Honolulu sought
reinstatement to her former position. The appellant, a reporter,
had refused to disclose his confidential source of information
regarding attempts by the members of the Commission to fire the
employee, arguing that since freedom to gather news was a neces-
sary antecedent to freedom to publish news, both were con-
stitutionally protected components of freedom of the press. Thus
the reporter concluded that compulsory disclosure of his sources
would violate his constitutionally guaranteed right to gather news.
The court rejected this argument on two grounds: no case had
ever conferred such constitutional protection on newsmen, and
such protection would interfere with the effective and fair admin-
istration of justice.
The court, noting that the public interest in judicial adminis-
tration includes the individual's due process right to compel the
presence and testimony of witnesses in a court of law, stated:
"Correlatively, every person, promptly summoned, is required to
attend court and give his testimony unless specifically exempted
or privileged." 8 6
The dissenting opinion of Judge Mizuha provides a strong and
compelling argument that a newsman does have a constitutional
right to protect his confidential associations under the First
Amendment. First, the dissent points out that the popular notion
that English common law evidentiary rules favored compulsory
testimony and disfavored special privileges is an erroneous as-
sumption. On the contrary, Madison expressly stated that English
common law regarding press testimony "cannot... be the stan-
dard of its freedom in the United States." 87 In view of the broad
and expansive scope which had been given to the First Amend-
ment freedoms, particularly freedom of the press, under the deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, 88 the likely effect of
compulsory disclosure on press freedom has to be weighed
against a procedural rule requiring discovery of the newsman's
information. Since newsworthy information, especially concerning
politics, was often confided to newsmen only on condition that the
source be kept secret, the dissent concluded:
[R]efusal of this condition [of non-disclosure] means refusal
85 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472.
8 367 P.2d at 478.
87 367 P.2d at 491 (VI Writings of James Madison 1790-1802, 387). Madison's opinion
was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
256 (1941).
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of the information. To the extent that judicial compulsion
under a procedural rule which sanctions a 'fishing expedition'
renders such assurance to informants unavailable or pre-
carious, the flow of news to the public is pinched off at its
source and, pro tanto the public's right to know is dimin-
ished.8 9
Compulsory disclosure amounts to censorship of confidential
news sources, since the free flow of news to reporters is curtailed.
Thus a litigant's right to compel testimony which might lead to
admissible evidence is "too meager an interest" to outweigh "the
public interest in a free press which 'stands as one of the great
interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it
to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.' "90 Earlier cases which had
ordered disclosure of confidential sources were distinguishable,
since the public's interest in the subject matter (civil and criminal
libel) of those cases, and in disclosure of information to the grand
jury, court and disbarment proceeding involved, had outweighed
the public's need to protect the confidential source. 9 1 In contrast
with cases such as Garland which dealt with news of the affairs of
private persons, the present case concerned the administration of
the state's Civil Service Commission. Whereas information re-
garding private citizens might not be so critical as to outweigh a
litigant's need for compulsory testimony
the gathering of news relating to the administration of govern-
ment is sufficiently important to require judicial protection in
order to preserve the right of the people to full information
regarding the acts or omissions of public servants in order to
guard against maladministration or oppression of the govern-
ment.
92
Therefore the public's need to be informed regarding social and
political developments was far more crucial than a private liti-
gant's desire for compulsory testimony.
Constitutional protection of the newsman-source relationship
was granted in a recent case of Application of Caldwell (here-
inafter, Caldwell)93 on the rationale that testimonial compulsions
would infringe First Amendment rights of free speech, press and
association. Such infringement was held impermissible unless
there is "a clear showing of a compelling and overriding national
88 367 P.2d at 498-99.
89 367 P.2d at 495.
90 367 P.2d at 496-497, quoting from Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
250 (1936).
91 367. P.2d at 498.
92 367 P.2d at 496-497.
93 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D.Cal. 1970).
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interest that cannot be served by alternative means."9 4 The court
found that there was a constitutionally protected right of newsmen
to refuse to disclose the identities of their confidential associ-
ations. In Caldwell, a New York Times reporter was subpoenaed
to give testimony relating to interviews he had conducted with
officers and spokesmen of the Black Panther Party who were
testifying before a Federal Grand Jury. The court granted Cald-
well a protective order allowing him to conceal his sources from
disclosure, since forced revelation of his contacts would violate
his constitutional rights of free speech, press and association.
Although the outcome of the case certainly supports the privilege,
the opinion is quite inadequate since it does not thoughtfully
discuss the constitutional law grounds on which it rests.
B. The Argument for the Newsman's Privilege
as a Matter of Federal Constitutional Law
The crucial constitutional issue is whether the First Amend-
ment protects the freedom of the press to gather news as well as
the freedom of the press to disseminate news. Inherent in the
reporter's ability to gather news is the newsman's privilege not to
disclose his confidential associations in judicial proceedings, since
a promise of nondisclosure is the operant condition for the news-
man's access to information. The importance of this issue was
poignantly stated by Dorothy Thompson:
The suggestion that freedom of reporting can exclude access
to facts is extremely dangerous doctrine. The gleaning of
facts is essential to knowledge, without which the right to
publish is empty-and its exercise irresponsible. 95
Although the Supreme Court has held that a witness' personal
sacrifice does not excuse him from testifying,96 this principle is
not as compelling in the case of a newsman in view of the
unqualified constitutional mandate of "freedom of the press."
Instead, as Guest and Stanzler have asserted:
Rather than starting with the common law presumption
against any privilege and trying to justify an exception be-
cause of a constitutional interest, a proper analysis should
start with the constitutional presumption of a privilege and try
to justify its denial because of a common law interest in
compulsory testimony. 97
94 311 F.Supp. at 360.
95 
W. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 81 (1958).
96 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
97 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1, at 28.
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The First Amendment is broad enough to protect newsgathering
as an essential component of freedom of the press, and news-
gathering by its nature requires the newsman's right to refuse to
disclose his confidential associations and private communications.
Although the scope of the First Amendment freedom of the press
is as yet incompletely defined, the "Amendment rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society."98
This view was more fully detailed in the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp v. Florida:
Freedom of the press, however, is not an end in itself but a
means to the end of a free society. The scope and nature of
the constitutional protection of speech [press] must be viewed
in that light and in that light applied.99
An examination of the relevant Supreme Court decisions clear-
ly indicates that the First Amendment freedom of the press is to
be given an expansive interpretation. In Bridges v. California, 100
the Supreme Court reversed the petitioners' contempt convictions
for comments they published pertaining to pending litigation,
holding that there must be a clear and present danger of in-
terference with justice before the contempt power can be used to
limit freedom of speech and press. Speaking for the majority, Mr.
Justice Black noted that the First Amendment's purpose was to
guarantee Americans the greatest possible latitude in freedom of
religion, speech, assembly and petition. Since freedom of the
press was included in the same unrestricted grant of freedom,
"[lthe only conclusion supported by history is that the unqualified
prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to give
liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope
that could be countenanced in an orderly society."''1 The prin-
ciple announced in Bridges was reaffirmed in Craig v. Harney,l0 2
where the Court reversed the contempt convictions of a publisher,
an editorial writer, and a news reporter who had printed editorials
and news stories regarding actions taken by a judge in trials held
before his court. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy
stated:
A free press lies at the heart of our democracy and its pre-
8 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945).
99 328 U.S. 331, 354-55 (1946).
100314 U.S. 252 (1941).
101 314 U.S. at 265.
102331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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servation is essential to the survival of liberty. Any inroad
made upon the constitutional protection of a free press tends
to undermine the freedom of all men to print and to read the
truth.103
Clearly, the obstruction of justice required to permit a restric-
tion of the freedom of the press must be "extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high.' 01 4 A constitutionally
guaranteed newsman's privilege would not result in the severe
obstruction of justice specified by the Court, since the evidence
sought is generally otherwise available through discovery and
other investigative efforts of counsel. However, attorneys often
prefer the easier method of obtaining evidence vicariously through
the forced testimony of the newsmen whose own efforts produced
it.
The Court's expansive interpretation of the First Amendment
is found in other decisions involving comparable and interrelated
freedoms. In Thornhill v. Alabama,10 5 the Court reversed a con-
viction under a statute prohibiting picketing near any place of
business, when the picketers' purpose was to influence persons to
boycott that business. In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Mur-
phy expressed the Court's belief that restrictions on the freedoms
of speech and press limit the "opportunities for public education"
requisite for enlightened and informed public decision-making. 10 6
In discussing the scope of freedom of speech and press, he further
stated:
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution embraces at least the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous
restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. 10 7 [Emphasis
added].
The only justification for limiting First Amendment freedoms is
a "clear public interest" in forestalling a "clear and present dan-
ger:"
[W]hatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and
persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear
support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occa-
sion for permissible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition
103 331 U.S. at 383.
104 3 14 U.S. at 263.
1- 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
106 3 10 U.S. at 95.
10 7 310 U.S. at 101-102.
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to allow the widest room for discussion, the narrowest range
for its restriction .... 108
The Court further enunciated this constitutional principle in
Thomas v. Collins,10 9 in which the appellant, a labor union presi-
dent, had been found in contempt and sentenced to a fine and
imprisonment for violating a court restraining order by speaking
before an assembly of workers without registering or obtaining a
union organizer's card as required by state statute. His conviction
was reversed on the ground that the statute was a prior restraint
upon the appellant's First Amendment rights. The limitation
placed on the appellant-a limitation similar to that placed on a
newsman by the threat of compulsory disclosure of his con-
fidential associations and private communications-was suc-
cinctly characterized by the Court: "The threat of the restraining
order backed by the power of contempt, and of arrest for crime,
hung over every word."'110
In the opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge noted the "preferred
place" given to the First Amendment freedoms when balanced
against competing interests. He then stated that in weighing these
freedoms against any proposed restrictions, "it is the character of
the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard
governs the choice." '' The Court recognized the restrictive and
chilling effect which a restraining order or a contempt citation
could have upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, a
result equally likely when a newsman is threatened with a con-
tempt conviction:
When [the appellant was] served with the order he had three
choices: (1) to stand on his right and speak freely; (2) to quit,
refusing entirely to speak; (3) to trim, and even thus to risk
the penalty. He chose the first alternative. We think he was
within his rights in doing so. 11 2
Since the practical effect of the restraining order was to forbid
both solicitation of union membership and speech in favor of
unionism, the Court concluded that this restriction was not negli-
gible in view of the rights thus inhibited. A more limited restric-
tion on the freedoms of speech and association might appear more
acceptable, but "[i]f the restraint were smaller than it is, it is from
petty tyrannies that large ones take root and grow. This fact can
108 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944).
109 323 U.S. 516(1944).
110 323 U.S. at 534.
1 323 U.S. at 529-30.
112 323 U.S. at 536.
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be no more plain than when they are imposed on the most basic
rights of all." 113
The case's final important principle, one clearly applicable to
the newsman's privilege situation, is that although the First
Amendment freedom is exercised in conjunction with economic
activity, this fact alone does not limit the protection accorded to
that freedom:
The idea is not sound therefore that the First Amend-
ment's safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business or eco-
nomic activity. And it does not resolve where the line shall be
drawn in a particular case merely to urge, as Texas does, that
an organization for which the rights of free speech and free
assembly are claimed is one 'engaged in business activities'
or that the individual who leads it in exercising these rights
receives compensation for doing So. 1 1 4
There is a constitutional basis for the proposition that freedom
of the press includes newsgathering as well as the publication and
dissemination of news, since the First Amendment's scope is not
limited by a narrow, literal definition of the broad, general free-
doms specifically enumerated, but encompasses the particularized
components and accessories which give those freedoms life. 115 In
Lamont v. Postmaster General, a federal statute authorizing the
Post Office to detain communist political propaganda sent through
the mails until the addressee had requested its delivery was held
an unconstitutional impairment of the addressee's First Amend-
ment rights, since an affirmative obligation was imposed on him as
a prior condition to the exercise of those freedoms. 1 6 Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority, did not specify the particular
First Amendment right which had been abridged, and a right to
receive political literature is clearly not within the traditional
scope of freedom of speech, press, religion, or assembly. How-
ever, the Court was interpreting the First Amendment as a for-
tress which has the freedoms of speech, press, religion, and as-
sembly as its major structures. 117 This conception was more fully
elaborated by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion
where he argued that although the First Amendment does not
explicitly ensure access to publications,
113 323 U.S. at 543.
114 323 U.S. at 53 1. The principle announced in Thomas was reaffirmed by the Court in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 396-397 (1967).
15 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
116 381 U.S. at 305.
11 7 The Court has so interpreted the First Amendment on other occasions. Griswold v.
Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific
guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment those
equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the
express guarantees fully meaningful ... I think the right to
receive publications is such a fundamental right. The dis-
semination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise will-
ing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers
and no buyers. 118
It is through this rationale that newsgathering becomes con-
stitutionally protected. Although there is no indication that the
Framers intended freedom of the press to encompass news-
gathering, 119 it is such an essential element of news publication
and dissemination that it is, a fortiori, consitutionally protected.
Newsgathering is one of those implicit rights "necessary to make
the express guarantees fully meaningful.- 120 "Moreover, the ex-
clusion of newsgathering from the First Amendment coverage is
unresponsive to the policy of the amendment." 121
Although Zemel v. Rusk122 and Estes v. Texas 123 contain dicta
to the effect that the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
press do not provide an unrestrained right to gather information12 4
they are readily distinguishable since that precise constitutional
question was not determinative in either case. In Zemel, the
Court held that the government's refusal to validate the appel-
lant's passport for travel to Cuba did not abridge any con-
stitutional right.12 5 One of the appellant's arguments was that the
First Amendment protected travel abroad where the purpose was
to gather information about government policies and their effects.
The Court emphasized the fact that it was the physical act of
travelling which was at issue n26 not the gathering of information
itself, since "[tihere are few restrictions on action which could not
be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data
flow."1 2 7 Speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the Court
refused to "accept the contention of appellant that it is a First
Amendment right which is involved."' 128 Furthermore, the Court
was concerned with the potentiality that such travel would pro-
118 381 U.S. at 308.
119 Guest & Stanzler, supra note I, at 31.
120 381 U.S. at 308.
121 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1, at 3 1.
122381 U.S. 1 (1965).
123 381 U.S. 352 (1965).
124381 U.S. at 17; 381 U.S. at 539.
125381 U.S. at 15-20.
126 381 U.S. at 16-17; 381 U.S. at 26 (Douglas, dissenting).
127381 U.S. at 17.
128381 U.S. at 16.
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mote "dangerous international incidents."' 129 Accordingly, this
case should be limited to its narrow holding that there is no
constitutional right to travel abroad, at least where a substantial
national security interest is concerned. Estes found that the tele-
vising of a criminal trial over the defendant's objections had
resulted in the confusion and domination of the trial by the ubi-
quitous presence and activities of the television technicians and
equipment. The Court held this to be an inherent denial of due
process which violated the fundamental right to a fair trial. 130
While no First Amendment claims were made in the case, 131 the
Court did acknowledge the possibility that its holding could
abridge freedom of the press to gather news. However, it con-
cluded that by allowing television reporters to attend the trial and
report on the proceedings without their equipment no con-
stitutional right was abridged' 32 since the restriction was imposed
only on the use of equipment in a way which jeopardized a fair
trial.' 3 3 Consequently, this case may only support a conclusion
that where the act of newsgathering prejudices the trial proceed-
ings there will be grounds for reversal. In any event, the Court's
holdings in these cases are not inconsistent with the conclusion
supported by Lamont that newsgathering is a protected com-
ponent of freedom of the press.
Furthermore, the Surpreme Court has announced a con-
stitutional principle favoring freedom of the press over the rights
of litigants in order to assure the free flow of news to the pub-
lic. 134 Two celebrated cases involving the First Amendment's
guarantee of a free press, New York Times v. Sullivan,'3 5 and
Time, Inc. v. Hill,'36 have firmly established that freedom of the
press must override the rights of private litigants when the public
interest in .the free flow of news is jeopardized as a result of the
private proceedings. In the New York Times case, the Court held
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited awarding
damages in actions brought by public officials for libellous criti-
cism of their official conduct, except where actual malice had been
proved as an element of the libel.' 3 7 In so holding, the Court made
129 381 U.S. at 15.
130 381 U.S. at 536-52.
131 381 U.S. at 614-15 (Stewart, dissenting). See381 U.S. 539-40.
132 381 U.S. at 541-42.
133 381 U.S. at 539-40.
134 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967).
135 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
136 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
137 376 U.S. 254. New York Times arose from a libel action brought by the respondent,
an elected public official responsible for supervision of the police department, for false and
misleading statements made in a political advertisement published in the New York Times,
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it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, for. a public
official to recover in such cases. This seemingly harsh result was
deemed necessary in light of the goal of the First Amendment "to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."1 3 8
The New York Times principle was extended in Time v. Hill3 9
to bar recovery by private individuals who had become news-
worthy. The First Amendment was held to protect free ex-
pression concerning newsworthy matters from tort actions in the
absence of proof of knowledge on the part of the publisher that
the reports were false or that they were published in reckless
disregard of the truth. 140 It thus becomes apparent that the per-
sonal interests of private litigants are subordinated to the public
interest in the freedom of the press, if that freedom would other-
wise be inhibited as a consequence of the legal proceeding.
The broad principle announced in New York Times and Time,
Inc. was elaborated by Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion in
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts,' 4 1 which extended the
protection of freedom of the press to statements made about
"public figures." According to Mr. Justice Harlan:
The guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not
designed to prevent 'the censorship of the press merely, but
any action of the government by means of which it might
prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as
seems absolutely essential ... '142
Justice Harlan explained further:
Our touchstones are that acceptable limitations must neither
affect 'the impartial distribution of news' and ideas . . . , nor
because of their history of impact constitute a special burden
on the press .... nor deprive our free society of the stimu-
lating benefit of varied ideas because their purveyors fear
physical or economic retribution solely because of what they
choose to think and publish. 143
If the First Amendment freedom of the press prevents private
which criticized police actions taken against students and Martin Luther King in a civil
rights demonstration.
138 376 U.S. at 269, quoting from Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
139 385 U.S. 374.(1967). Here, LIFE magazine had published a review of a play based on
the experiences of a family-represented by LIFE to be the Hill family-held hostage by
some escaped convicts. Some of the incidents portrayed in the play did not take place in
the Hill family's experience, although the article so implied.
140 385 U.S. 374.
141 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
142 388 U.S. at 150, quoting from 2 COOLEY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886 (8th
ed.).
143 388 U.S. at 150-15 1.
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litigants from recovering money damages in tort actions, it follows
that the Amendment also bars use of the judicial process and
powers to compel newsmen to disclose their confidential associ-
ations and private communications in order to provide such liti-
gants with evidence. When balanced against the First Amendment
freedom of the press, a litigant's interest in obtaining evidence
certainly has no greater weight than the right to recovery for
private wrongs.
In several instances, the First Amendment has been held to
prohibit compulsory disclosure of confidential associations and
private communications in contexts analogous to the newsman
situation. In Watkins v. United States,144 the Supreme Court
stated that
[a]buses of the investigative process may imperceptibly lead
to abridgment of protected freedoms. The mere summoning
of a witness and compelling him to testify against his will,
about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of
government interference. 145
In this case, the Court held a conviction for refusal to answer
questions of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities invalid, stating, "[c]learly, an investigation is
subject to the command that the Congress shall make no law
abridging freedom of speech or press or assembly." 146 In Sweezy
v. New Hampshire,147 the Court ruled that the First Amendment
freedoms were also protected against compulsory disclosure in
investigations conducted under state legislative authority when
the questions asked transgressed the petitioner's First Amend-
ment freedoms, concluding that while legislative investigating
bodies may have a need for information, they may not abridge
First Amendment freedoms in order to obtain it.148 This holding is
directly applicable to newsmen since their compulsory testimony
abridges both freedom of the press and other First Amendment
rights.
-144 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
145 354 U.S. at 197.
146 354 U.S. at 197.
147354 U.S. 234 (1957). Here, the petitioner had been summoned to testify before a
New Hampshire legislative investigating committee. He refused to answer questions
regarding his knowledge of the Progressive Party in New Hampshire and a lecture he had
given to a humanities class at the University of New Hampshire.
148 354 U.S. at 234. The rule of Watkins and Sweezy was more recently reaffirmed in
DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966), where the appellant had been
convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions about his past communist
activities. The Court held that the First Amendment protects political and associational
privacy where there is no overriding and compelling state interest. Since there was no
present demonstrable threat from the Communist Party in the state, the Court concluded
that the legislative investigation lacked the "compelling state interest" required to justify
abridgment of appellant's First Amendment rights.
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The First Amendment's protection of confidential associations
from compulsory disclosure in judicial proceedings was estab-
lished in the well-known case of N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,149
where the State of Alabama sought to require the N.A.A.C.P. to
disclose its membership lists and records. Upon its refusal to
reveal its membership, the N.A.A.C.P. was found in contempt
and fined $100,000. On appeal, the Supreme Court first held that
the N.A.A.C.P. had standing to assert its members' privilege not
to disclose their association, since to require individual members
to assert their rights personally would effectively deny those
rights. The Court then held that compulsory disclosure of mem-
bership lists would be an unconstitutional restraint on the First
Amendment freedom of association, unless the state could show a
compelling need to force disclosure. These principles are partic-
ularly important with respect to the newsman's privilege. First,
under N.A.A.C.P., the newsman has standing to assert the privi-
lege against compulsory disclosure of his confidential associations
and private communications, on behalf of both the publics' in-
terest, and his own interest, in the free flow of news. Second,
under the N4.A.C.P. case's reasoning, it is obvious that a litigant
may not use a sham need for evidence as a justification for
trammeling the First Amendment freedom of the press.
The principle that compulsory disclosure would result in unjus-
tified interference with freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment was affirmed in Bates v. Little Rock,150 which involved ,a
fact situation identical to that in N.A.A.C.P., with the additional
feature that evidence at trial showed that a significant number of
persons did not renew their memberships in the N.A.A.C.P. be-
cause they feared disclosure.1 51 Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for
the majority, held that "[w]here there is a significant encroach-
ment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling."' 52 Both
cases demonstrate that a litigant's mere assertion of a need for
evidence, without more, is not a sufficiently compelling interest to
subordinate more important First Amendment freedoms.
In another case involving the N.A.A.C.P., Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigative Committee,153 disclosure of membership
149 357"U.S. 449 (1958). Alabama claimed that such disclosure was necessary to prove
that the N.A.A.C.P. was doing a substantial business in the state without complying with
the relevant statute. The N.A.A.C.P. admitted its failure to comply with the statute, but
disclaimed the statute's applicability to the N.A.A.C.P. and refused to produce its records
and membership lists.
150 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
151 361 U.S. at 521.
152 361 U.S. at 524.
153 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
FALL 19701
Journal of Law Reform
lists was sought by a committee investigating the N.A.A.C.P.
Gibson, custodian of the lists, refused to produce them, and
therefore was cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held that
the contempt conviction violated the First Amendment rights of
free speech and free association because there was no compelling
governmental interest to justify the abridgment of constitutional
rights which would result from disclosure. In his concurring opin-
ion, Mr. Justice Douglas said that "the associational rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment are in my view much broader and
cover the entire spectrum in political ideology as well as in art, in
journalism, in teaching, and in religion. ' 154 He then concluded:
"One man's privacy may not be invaded because of another's
perversity." 155
Moreover, in Talley v. California1 56 the First Amendment free-
doms of speech and press were held to protect anonymity of
sources and confidential associations, 157 and the reasoning of this
decision provides a close analogy to the newsman's privilege. The
Court reversed the petitioner's conviction and $10 fine for dis-
tributing handbills in violation of an ordinance requiring dis-
closure on the handbills of the identity of those persons printing
and distributing them. The ordinance was held void on its face
because it violated the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
press. As the Court recognized; "[elven the Federalist Papers,
written in favor of adoption of our Constitution, were published
under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes
been assumed for the most constructive purposes." 5s Mr. Justice
Black, speaking for the Court, then summarized the concepts
involved:
We have recently had occasion to hold in two cases that
there are times and circumstances when States may not com-
pel members of groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas
to be publicly identified .... The reason for those holdings
was that identification and fear of reprisal might deter per-
fectly peaceful discussion of public matters of importance. 159
Clearly, members of unpopular groups who are news sources also
require anonymity in order to have their views reach the rest of
society through the news media.
In Russell v. United States,16 0 the Court reversed the petition-
154372 U.S. at 565.
155 372 U.S. at 572.
156 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
157 362 U.S. at 65.
158 362 U.S. at 65.
159 362 U.S. at 65.
160 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
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ers' convictions for refusal to answer pertinent questions of a
Congressional committee investigating communist infiltration of
the press. Although the reversals were based on technical grounds
relating to defects in the indictments, Mr. Justice Douglas in his
concurring opinion discussed the broader First Amendment prin-
ciples at stake. In his view,
the editorials written and the news printed and the policies
advocated by the press are none of the Government's busi-
ness. I see no justification for the Government investigating
the capacities, leanings, ideology, qualifications, prejudices or
politics of those who collect or write the news. 161
Although two Supreme Court cases have held that a compelling
governmental interest has outweighed the First Amendment pro-
hibition against compulsory disclosure of confidential associations
and private communications, and examination of these cases'
reasoning shows that they do not undermine the basic con-
stitutional validity of the newsman's privilege. In United States v.
Harriss,162 the appellees had been charged with violation of the
federal Lobbying Act which required persons lobbying in Con-
gress to register and provide information as to the source of their
contributions and the nature of their expenditures. The District
Court dismissed the charge on the grounds that the Act was an
unconstitutional interference with the appellees' First Amend-
ment rights. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on
the ground that the Lobbying Act did not violate the First
Amendment, since there was an overriding Congressional need to
have sufficient knowledge to properly evaluate the information
Congressmen received and the pressure which they felt, a need
which could not be fuffilled by alternative means.163 Here, the
Court was faced with a legislative requirement basic to the
effective functioning of the American system of democracy found-
ed upon representative government. 164 However, in contrast with
the legislature's requirement to be fully informed, recognition of
the newsman's privilege in the context of the judicial system
would not have such a grave effect, since the most serious con-
sequence would be that a particular litigant might be left without
remedy. But as already discussed in relation to New York Times
and Time, Inc., supra, this consequence is not a sufficient reason
for abridging First Amendment freedoms.
In Barenblatt v. United States, 6 5 the Court also found a com-
1617369 U.S. at 776-777.
162 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
163 347 U.S. at 625-626.
164 347 U.S. at 625-626.
1- 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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pelling governmental interest of sufficient weight to subordinate
the protection that the First Amendment provides for confidential
associations. Here, the petitioner, a former graduate student and
teaching fellow at the University of Michigan, refused to testify
before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities which was investigating Communist infiltration of edu-
cation and was convicted of contempt of Congress. The Court
affirmed the conviction:
Undeniably, the First Amendment in some circumstances
protects an individual from being compelled to disclose his
associational relationships. However, the protections of the
First Amendment, unlike a proper claim of the privilege
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, do not
afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circum-
stances. Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar
governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always in-
volves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and
public interests at stake in the particular circumstances
shown. 166
The case's authority may properly be questioned in light of the
more recent court decisions involving the same issue discussed
above. Furthermore, the fact that the Court applied a balancing
test does not deny the First Amendment's protection of con-
fidential associations; instead, it only demonstrates that there are
circumstances in which that protection must give way. But the
serious import of the balancing test and its questionable results
were pointedly criticized by Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion:
To apply the Court's balancing test under such circum-
stances is to read the First Amendment to say 'Congress
shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assem-
bly and petition, unless Congress and the Supreme Court
reach the joint conclusion that on balance the interest of the
Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the
interest of the people in having them exercised. ' 167
Thus, whatever test is eventually applied, the general proposi-
tion that the First Amendment freedom of the press protects the
confidential associations and private communications of newsmen
from compulsory disclosure seems an inescapable conclusion.
166 360 U.S. at 126.
167 360 U.S. at 143.
[VOL. 4:1
The Newsman's Privilege
Accordingly, the constitutional newsman's privilege mandates an
absolute privilege which protects not only the identity of the
source, but also the information, whether published or not, which
result from the newsman-source relationship. While no limitation
on this constitutional privilege seems proper or reasonable, it is at
least arguable that some limitation may be permissble. In that
event, the only constitutionally acceptable limitation should be
that announced by the court in Caldwell: "A clear showing of a
compelling and overriding national interest that cannot be served
by alternative means. '"168
V. CONCLUSION
A free and robust press is critical today when the American
people are seeking to understand the numerous and diverse cur-
rents running through their complex society. If freedom of the
press is to meet this demand, newsgathering must be brought
within the protection of the First Amendment. The confidential
associations and private communications of newsmen, which are
the foundations of newsgathering, must be constitutionally pro-
tected or meaningful news will become unavailable to the public.
The newsman's privilege was never recognized at common
law-which emphasized the litigant's right to all available evi-
dence. Furthermore, all attempts to create a newsman's privilege
by analogy to other recognized privileges, such as attorney-client,
doctor-patient, and penitent-priest, have been rejected by the
courts who disfavor any expansion of the privilege doctrine. As a
result, the creation of a newsman's privilege has become the
province of the legislatures. While some states have enacted stat-
utes providing substantial protection for this fragile relationship,
they do not achieve the full protection which seems necessary.
With a few exceptions, they protect only the confidential associ-
ations and not the private communications or documents obtained
from them.
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press sug-
gests a constitutional basis for a newsman's privilege. The deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court under that amendment
make the conclusion that the confidential associations and private
communications of newsmen are constitutionally protected in-
escapable. However, the Court has never decided the precise
question, and the lower federal courts and state supreme courts
which have considered it have, with one notable recent exception,
168 311 F.Supp. at 360.
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held that there is no newsman's privilege as a matter of federal
constitutional law. Nevertheless, their cases should be accorded
little weight when the question is again presented as the reasoning
behind their decisions is generally questionable and always un-
satisfactory.
- Wayne C. Dabb, Jr.
and
Peter A. Kelly
The Newsman's Privilege
APPENDIX I
INFORMATION NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR ATTRIBUTION
Both Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roose-
velt imposed restrictions on the use which newsmen could make
of information provided for them. W. RIVERS, THE OPIN-
ION-MAKERS 133-34 (1967). Thus, Mr. Rivers makes the following
observations:
These were background-only conferences, which allowed
[Theodore], Roosevelt a maximum range of comment and no
responsibility for anything that was printed. TR was also
interviewed endlessly, but he made it clear that he was not to
be quoted on the disclosures that might damage him. Anyone
who abused his freely given confidences was assigned to the
Ananias Club [Ananias, a biblical personage, was a liar who
dropped dead when Peter rebuked him. Acts 5:1-6] and cut
off from all White House news.
What [Franklin D.] Roosevelt did in that first press confer-
ence was essentially simple: Even with a press corps of more
than three hundred correspondents, he was promising the
same intimate view of the Presidency that his cousin Theo-
dore had afforded the few dozen reporters who had covered
Washington a decade earlier. He said:
I am told that what I am about to do will become
impossible, but I am going to try it. We are not going to
have any more written questions; and, of course, while I
cannot answer seventy-five or a hundred questions sim-
ply because I haven't got the time, I see no reason why
I should not talk to you ladies and gentlemen off the
record in just the way I used to do in the Navy Depart-
ment down here .... There will be a great many ques-
tions, of course, that I won't answer, either because
they are "if" questions-and I never answer them ....
And the others, of course, are the questions which for
various reasons I do not want to discuss, or I am not
ready to discuss, or I do not know anything about.
There will be a great many questions you will ask that I
do not know enough about to answer.
Then, in regard to news announcements, Steve [Press
Secretary Stephen Early] and I thought it would be best
that straight news for use from this office should always
be without direct quotation. In other words, I do not
want to be directly quoted unless direct quotations are
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given out by Steve in writing. That makes that perfectly
clear.
Then there are two other matters we will talk about:
The first is "background information," which means ma-
terial which can be used by all of you on your own
authority and responsibility, not to be attributed to the
White House, because I do not want to have to revive
the Ananias Club.
Then the second thing is off-the-record information,
which means, of course, confidential information which
is given only to those who attend the conference ....
